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ABSTRACT 
 
Fuzzy Rule Interpolation (FRI) methods can serve deducible (interpolated) conclusions even in case if some 
situations are not explicitly defined in a fuzzy rule based knowledge representation. This property can be 
beneficial in partial heuristically solved applications; there the efficiency of expert knowledge 
representation is mixed with the precision of machine learning methods. The goal of this paper is to 
introduce the benefits of FRI in the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) application area, in the design and 
implementation of the detection mechanism for Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks. In the 
example of the paper as a test-bed environment an open source DDOS dataset and the General Public 
License (GNU) FRI Toolbox was applied. The performance of the FRI-IDS example application is 
compared to other common classification algorithms used for detecting DDOS attacks on the same open 
source test-bed environment. According to the results, the overall detection rate of the FRI-IDS is in pair 
with other methods. On the example dataset it outperforms the detection rate of the support vector machine 
algorithm, whereas other algorithms (neural network, random forest and decision tree) recorded lightly 
higher detection rate. Consequently, the FRI inference system could be a suitable approach to be 
implemented as a detection mechanism for IDS; it effectively decreases the false positive rate value. 
Moreover, because of its fuzzy rule base knowledge representation nature, it can easily adapt expert 
knowledge, and also be-suitable for predicting the level of degree for threat possibility. 
Keywords: Fuzzy Rule Interpolation, Inference System, Intrusion Detection System, DDOS Attack, 
Detection Mechanism 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Regarding to the rapid development of 
technology, the number of intrusions increased and 
developed continuously. In every day, there are 
large amounts of financial loss, privacy violation 
and information transfers in an illegal way as a 
result of succeeding intrusions implementation. 
There are different types of intrusions threatening 
network, computer information and resources. 
Many types of intrusions exist, such as user to root 
intrusion, where the goal of this type of intrusion is 
to have a full right permission of computer and 
network resources. Probing intrusion is another type 
of intrusion where the goal is to determine the 
weaknesses of computer and network resources 
based on scanning techniques. The previous types 
of intrusions could be implemented to be 
prerequisite steps of the Denial Of Service (DOS) 
intrusions. This type of intrusion heading to 
consume various resources in order to close-down 
several services for legal users. The distribution of 
DOS attacks represents the 60% of total number of 
attacks around the world [1]. 
 
IDS is one of the effective solutions to 
detect and prevent intrusions occurrence. 
According to the large amount of financial loss and 
privacy violation of intrusions, IDS has become a 
fundamental solution of network security. There are 
different challenges in implementing a sufficient 
IDS. One of these challenges is the binary decision 
in detection techniques. The typical detection 
mechanisms of IDS had a boundary problem [2]. 
The fuzzy system offers several advantages to 
handle the boundary problems. It also presents the 
detection degree level of intrusions which could be 
more readable for the security engineer. In this 
work, we break down the implementation of FRI 
inference system as a detection mechanism for 
DDOS attacks into three main steps. 
 
• Step 1: To identify observable features 
suitable for IDS and the way they can handle 
the intrusion boundaries problem. 
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• Step 2: To implement FRI-IDS model as a 
detection mechanism for DDOS attacks. 
• Step 3: To compare the FRI-IDS model with 
other literature’s results, which had used the 
same test-bed environment with different 
classification algorithms for detecting DDOS 
attacks. 
 
The rest of paper organized as follows: 
section (2) presents recent works related to the 
application of the fuzzy system for IDS. In section 
(3) typical types of IDS are introduced. Distributed 
denial of service attacks is illustrated in section (4) 
then the fuzzy rule interpolation is introduced in 
section (5). The analysis of DDOS dataset and 
preprocess steps illustrated in section (6). In section 
(7) the implementation of FRI-IDS model as a 
detection mechanism is introduced in details, 
followed by experiments and discussion in sections 
(8). The difference of prior works is introduced in 
section (9). Finally, section (10) concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. IDS FOR DDOS ATTACKS 
 
This section presents some relevant works 
related to the application of fuzzy system for 
intrusion detection. It also provides a brief 
overview of different methods and approaches that 
are used for intrusion detection. 
 
In [3], authors implement an architecture 
to detect DDOS attack using Fuzzy Reasoning 
Spiking Neural-P (FRSN-P). It is a type of 
membrane computing system. The neurons within 
this system communicates based on electrical 
spikes (impulses). The Knowledge Discovery 
Databases (KDD-99) dataset imported in the 
proposed system. KDD-99 dataset was prepared by 
the University of California [4]. The constraint was 
on a synchronization flood. Authors extracted the 
synchronization flood attack from KDD-99 dataset. 
After extracting the required records of the desired 
attack, the fuzzy reasoning spiking neural-P was 
implemented and evaluated. According to the 
presented results, the proposed system was able to 
reach 0.02% false negative and 0.25% false positive 
detection rate. 
 
Authors in [5], proposed a network IDS 
based on automatic fuzzy rule base generation. The 
single length of frequent item approach was 
implemented as preprocess step to generate the 
required fuzzy rule base automatically. KDD-99 
dataset was used to evaluate the proposed system. 
The implemented experiments demonstrated that 
the proposed system obtained 90% as overall 
accuracy rate. 
 
The work of [6], focuses on detecting and 
preventing the Neptune attack. It is a type of TCP 
flood attack and belongs to DOS attacks. The 
enhanced release of KDD99 dataset (NSL-KDD) 
was imported to test and evaluate the proposed 
fuzzy system [7]. According to the implementation 
of the proposed fuzzy system, feature ranking 
algorithm was implemented to select the relevant 
features for the detection approach. The proposed 
fuzzy system was evaluated with decision tree 
algorithm using the NSL-KDD dataset. It was 
succeeded to obtain 0.93% as the overall average 
accuracy rate for detecting Neptune attack. 
Compared with decision tree algorithm, the 
proposed fuzzy system had the highest average 
accuracy rate. 
 
There are many IDS methods 
implementing feature selection algorithms. A large 
number of features can be collected using several 
network tools. However, not all of them are 
relevant to the detection mechanism. The primary 
aim of feature selection algorithms is to reduce the 
computation time by reducing the size of data. It 
can reduce the problem space by reducing the 
required feature set to a minimum [8]. 
 
Authors in [2], proposed a network IDS 
based on fuzzy system. Feature selection algorithm 
was applied for reducing the originally large (41) 
number of features of the KDD-99 dataset. The 
authors divided the imported dataset into two parts, 
the first part for training phase and the second part 
for testing phase. The fuzzy rules generated based 
on the instructions of a knowledge expert. The 
proposed fuzzy system was able to achieve 0.95% 
average accuracy. Other algorithms were also used 
in combination with a fuzzy system to detect and 
prevent intrusions. In [9], a hybrid approach of 
genetic algorithm and fuzzy system was proposed 
for detecting DOS attacks. The main purpose of 
implementing genetic algorithm was the automatic 
fuzzy rule generation, as a preprocess step of the 
IDS construction. The testbed environment was the 
KDD-99 dataset. The proposed system achieved 
0.94% average detection rate. 
 
There are other hybrid fuzzy IDS solutions 
too. In [10], the authors combine the neural network 
and fuzzy system to enhance the detecting rate of 
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intrusion detection. The fuzzy rule base is generated 
based on expert knowledge base. The neuro fuzzy 
IDS achieved 0.93% average detection rate. In [11], 
a combination of fuzzy system and decision tree 
algorithm was implemented and evaluated. Features 
selection was applied to reduce the size of feature 
space. Moreover, the decision tree algorithm was 
applied to extract automatically the fuzzy rule base. 
The proposed system reached 0.99% average 
accuracy rate. 
 
In [12], authors focused on enhancing the 
detection rate of IDS based on combining the fuzzy 
system and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) 
method. The PSO was applied for generating fuzzy 
rule base in order to detect DDOS attacks. As a 
result of the PSO generated fuzzy rules, the 
proposed fuzzy system was able to reach 0.93% as 
a detection rate average. 
 
The past works provided convincing 
contributions and supporting the idea that the fuzzy 
rule based model is a useful device for IDS 
implementation. The goal of this paper is to 
introduce the benefits of the FRI application at the 
IDS application area, mainly tackling the 
distributed denial of service type attacks. The aim 
behind using the FRI is the simplification of the 
expert rule base and the extension of the binary 
decision problem to continuous truth value, in 
which conclusions like    ”the level of the attack” 
can be also simply defined. 
 
3. IDS IMPLEMENTATION 
 
This section provides a brief overview to 
the IDS problem domain. It also shortly describes 
how IDS detects intrusion within the network. IDS 
is one of the significant solution that’s monitors the 
network traffic, in order to observe and detect 
intrusions. Recently, IDS has become a 
fundamental component in network security design. 
Any attempt to use and consume network/computer 
resources is presented as DOS intrusion. One of the 
main functions of IDS system is to generate alerts 
when an intruder appears within the protected 
network. IDS can be implemented either as a 
software platform or as a hardware device.  
    
Typically, IDS includes the following 
three modules: audited module, analyzer module 
and response module [13]. There are different types 
of IDS that can be distinguished depending on the 
source of audited data within network and also 
based on the implemented detection mechanism. 
According to the applied detection mechanism, 
there are two types of IDS [14, 15]: 
• Anomaly based detection 
• Signature based detection 
 
The signature-based detection implements 
the search mechanism for known sequence series of 
packets (signature) of intrusion. If the current series 
of packets/bytes matched the stored sequence series 
of packets, the intrusion alert raised. It is extremely 
efficient with no false alarms for past detected 
intrusions. On the other hand, it had weaknesses, 
such as it is only efficient with the known 
intrusions that had a stored signature [16]. 
 
The anomaly-based IDS detects the 
intrusions based on comparing the current network 
traffic with the historical baseline data of normal 
traffic. If the current network traffic exceeds the 
predefined baseline normal traffic, the intrusion 
alert raises. It had a chance to detect the novel 
intrusions with a high proportion of false positive 
alerts. Additionally, anomaly based detection 
mechanism requires a large amount of training data 
for identifying the normal behavior [17]. 
 
IDS can be also categorized based on the 
source of audited data as follows: Network 
Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) or Host 
Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). HIDS monitors 
and protects a specific device within the network. 
Meanwhile, NIDS implemented to protect and 
detect intrusions of all the connected devices within 
a network. 
 
4. DDOS ATTACKS 
 
The DDOS attack is treated as one of the 
most harmful types of attack. Nowadays, DDOS 
attacks are considered as a continuous challenge for 
both users and organizations. The first serious 
DDOS attack was appeared in 2000 against Yahoo 
[18]. The main purpose of DDOS attacks is to 
consume different types of resources such as 
network bandwidth, CPU, memory utilization etc. 
Any consumption of these resources will increase 
the overloading and as a result different services 
would be unavailable for legal users. 
 
In 2015, according to Kaspersky security 
report [19], the approximate cost of DDOS attack 
were 52000 $ for small businesses and around 
440,000 $ for enterprise businesses. In 2016, the 
dangerous effect of DDOS reached 80 countries 
around the world [20]. There different types of 
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(DDOS) attacks such as smurf attack where an 
intruder sends large numbers of Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMP) echo packets to the 
intended victim. In most situations the intermediary 
(slave) machine does not filter ICMP messages, 
therefore, many clients on the network who receive 
this ICMP echo request send ICMP replay back. 
Another type of DDOS attacks is the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP) flood attack. It is one of 
the most common types of DDOS attack, where the 
intruders send large number of UDP traffics to the 
victim within a specific period of time. From 
another perspective, the HTTP-flood attack is 
considered as a difficult one to detect. According to 
HTTP-flood attack, the intruder sends completely 
normal posted messages with a very slow rate in a 
systematic way, this type of DDOS is difficult to 
detect because its behavior seems as a normal 
behavior [21]. 
 
Another type of modern DDOS attack is a 
Simple Query Language (SQL) Injection 
Distributed Denial Of Service (SIDDOS). 
According to this type of DDOS, the intruder 
inserts a malicious SQL statement as a string in the 
browser side, then it is forwarded to the victim as 
an executed statement [22]. 
 
5. FUZZY INFERENCE SYSTEM 
 
The term of fuzzy logic was produced by 
Professor Lotfi Zadeh [23]. Fuzzy logic appears in 
many successful sophisticated systems in many 
application areas. There are some application areas 
where the two valued logic and the related binary 
decision could lead to inefficient solutions. Fuzzy 
logic offers several advantages to handle the binary 
decision problems [24]. 
 
There are some requirements emerging 
during the design and implementation of fuzzy 
system. The inputs and outputs of the fuzzy system 
should be clearly defined, then the fuzzy partitions 
of the input and output universes should be 
established, then the fuzzy rule base must be 
completely prepared. 
 
Fuzzy partitions of the input values 
provide a significant way to define the real input 
value with each predefined linguistic term [25]. For 
generating a conclusion by a fuzzy system, first the 
crisp inputs are transformed to fuzzy sets by the 
fuzzifier, then from the fuzzified input, the fuzzy 
inference system calculates the fuzzy conclusion. 
At the end, the crisp output is prepared by 
defuzzification of the fuzzy conclusion [26]. 
 
In typical classical fuzzy inference system, 
the fuzzy rule base is extracted from expert 
knowledge. To be able to handle all the possible 
input values, the fuzzy rule base must cover all the 
input universes. Therefore, the step of the fuzzy 
rule base considered as the most critical step during 
the design of the fuzzy system. In general, 
generating a complete fuzzy rule base in a 
multidimensional problem is difficult to be 
implemented because of the lack of information for 
all the possible fuzzy rules. In case of missing rule 
definitions, there could be some observation which 
is not covered by any of the fuzzy rules, in that case 
no conclusion can be gained from the rule base. The 
FRI methods can solve this situation [27]. FRI 
methods can generate their approximate 
conclusions either directly from inputs by an 
interpolating fuzzy function, or by interpolating a 
new fuzzy rule which overlaps the input [28]. 
 
6. DDOS DATA-SET 
 
There are several open source datasets that 
exist which include intrusions related data. These 
datasets provide a convenient environment for 
research purposes. In this work, the DDOS dataset 
of [21] was used as a test-bed environment for 
testing the FRI inference based IDS solutions. 
 
The DDOS dataset includes intrusions 
related data, such as HTTP flood and SIDDOS. 
This dataset can be downloaded freely for research 
purposes from [29]. The distribution of the recorded 
attack types within the DDOS dataset summarized 
in Table 1. 
Table 1: Distribution Of DDOS Dataset Attacks. 
Attack Number of Records 
SIDDOS 6665 
HTTP Flood 4110 
UDP Flood 201344 
SMURF 12590 
 
The discrete and continues features 
appearing in the DDOS dataset are presented in 
Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. 
Table 2: The Discrete Features Of DDOS Dataset. 
Index Features Description 
6 PKT TYPE Packet Type Based on 
Used Protocol 
8 FLAGS 7-Digit Flag Strings 
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11 NODE NAME 
FROM 
Client Name That 
Sends The Packet 
 
12 NODE NAME TO Client Name That 
Receives The Packet 
28 PKT CLASS The Class of Packet 
Table 3: The Continues Features of DDOS Dataset. 
Index Features Description 
1 SRC ADD Port of Source Address 
2 DES ADD Port Destination Address 
3 PKT ID Packet Identifier 
4 FROM NODE Define client sending 
packet 
5 TO NODE Define client receiving 
packet 
7 PKT SIZE The Packet Size in bytes 
9 FID Flow Identifier 
10 SEQ NUMBER Sequence Number 
13 NUMBER OF 
PKT 
Total Number of Packets 
14 NUMBER OF 
BYTE 
Total Number of bytes 
15 PKT IN Total Time of Packet 
Inside Queue 
16 PKT OUT Total Time of Packet 
Outside Queue 
17 PKT R Time of Packet Received 
18 PKT DELAY 
NODE 
TimePacketDelayWithin 
Node 
19 PKT RATE Average Packet Rate 
20 BYTE RATE Average byte Rate 
21 PKT AVG SIZE Average Packet Size 
22 UTILIZATION Bandwidth Utilization 
23 PKT DELAY Total Time of Packet 
Delay 
24 PKT SEND TIME Time of Sending Packet 
25 PKT RECEIVED 
TIME 
Time of Receiving 
Packet 
26 FIRST PKT SENT Time of First Packet 
Sent 
27 LAST PKT  
RECEIVED 
Time of Last Packet 
Received 
 
6.1 Dataset Preprocessing And Features 
Selection 
The DDOS dataset consisted of a large 
number of connection records. Because of that, we 
extracted 10% of total number of intrusions records. 
The extracted DDOS dataset listed in Table  4. 
Table 4: The Extracted DDOS Dataset. 
Class Name Number of Connection 
Records 
SIDDOS 676 
HTTP Flood 441 
UDP Flood 20135 
SMURF 1260 
Normal 193000 
The typical IDS detects the packet based 
on predefined rules such as SNORT [30]. The rules 
which are responsible for distinguishing intrusion 
from normal packets must be created based on the 
features given in the intrusion dataset. There is a 
large number of features could be recorded during 
the collection of intrusions dataset. These features 
could be recorded using any network monitoring 
tools. Generally, most of them are not relevant 
features. It means that features are not relevant in 
the detection of a given type of intrusion. Features 
selection considered as an important step because if 
there are irrelevant features then it could decrease 
the performance of the final IDS.  
 
Features selection in the example of this 
paper the Information Gain (IG) algorithm [31] was 
selected. The IG algorithm is based on the concept 
of entropy. According to [32], entropy parameter 
computed to characterize the relevantly of each 
feature. Suppose that, E = (E,P) be a discrete 
probability space, where E = {E1,E2,....,En} is the 
finite set of the selected features. Each of selected 
features had the following probabilities Pi,               
i =1, 2,....., n. The entropy for each features 
computed as Equation 1 illustrated. 
Entropy (E) = − 
i
 pi log 2  (pi)                   (1) 
 After the entropy parameters calculated for 
each feature of the DDOS dataset, the next step is to 
calculate the IG values. IG computed based on the 
predefined collected entropy parameters and the set 
of all possible values for the feature, Equation 2 
presents the calculation formula of IG. 
IG = Entropy (E) -  
n
EK  Entropy (Ek)           (2) 
Where n presents the total number of 
instance of records, Ek denotes the total number of 
instance of records that belongs to the class k. 
Table 5 summarizes the top ten relevant features 
using IG algorithm. 
Table 5: The Relevant Features Using IG Algorithm. 
No. Features IG Values 
1 PKT RATE 0.3811300 
2 BYTE RATE 0.3809683 
3 UTILIZATION 0.3809683 
4 PKT SIZE 0.3803146 
5 PKT AVG SIZE 0.3786557 
6 NUMBER OF PKT 0.3740723 
  
6 
 
7 PKT DELAY 0.3630512 
8 NUMBER OF BYTE 0.3630512 
9 FIRST PKT SENT 0.3513514 
10 PKT DELAY NODE 0.3321921 
 
7. FRI-IDS MODEL GENERATION 
 
In this section the full architecture of FRI-
IDS model discussed including its main functions 
and interactions. Typically, in classical fuzzy 
system, the inferring of consequences could not be 
deduced in case if some situations were not 
explicitly defined in a fuzzy rule based. Therefore, 
the inferring of consequences of fuzzy system 
required a completed fuzzy rule base.  
 
In case of sparse fuzzy rules which were 
not covered all of possible situations, FRI methods 
offer the capability to generate the possible 
inference, even in case of lack definitions and 
information of existing knowledge representation. 
This benefit could be beneficial in partial 
heuristically solved applications. Suppose that, 
there is an observation x existed and did not 
explicitly defined in a fuzzy rule based.  
 
Equation 3 presents the union of the 
antecedent part of fuzzy rules in sparse rule [28]. 

k
i 1
 supp(Ai)   X   
k
i 1
 supp(Ai) =0           (3) 
In the opposite case, if there is a 
completed fuzzy rule base, then the union of an 
antecedent part of fuzzy rules was covering all of 
the input universes as Equation 4 presented. 
 
k
i 1
 supp(Ai) = X                   (4) 
supp refers to support. The support of a 
fuzzy set indicates the set of all elements within the 
universe of discourse which their degree of 
membership is greater than zero. Further, Xi is the 
ith input universe of discourse, Aik is the kth set of 
the partition of Xi. Additionally, Figure 1 illustrates 
the case of sparse rule, when the observation x 
appeared and was not covered by any fuzzy rule 
base. Figure 2 illustrates the case of complete rules, 
when the observation x appeared and was covered 
by fuzzy rule base. 
 
The FRI-IDS model was a description of 
the problem domain (IDS application area). It 
constraints of the key features (relevant features) to 
detect the intrusion. 
 
Figure 1: The Case Of Sparse Fuzzy Rule 
 
Figure 2: The Case Of Complete Fuzzy Rules 
There are four major components needed 
to implement the FRI-IDS model as a detection 
mechanism: 
• Setup the input and output of the FRI-IDS 
model. (The input parameters of FRI-IDS 
model were the relevant features of the test-
bed dataset which are mentioned in Table 5, 
the output of FRI-IDS model supposed to be 
the level of attack instead of binary decision). 
• Setup the fuzzy sets for each input/output of 
the FRI-IDS model. (This component 
introduced in details in section (7.2)). 
• Setup the fuzzy rules for all the possible 
events of normal and intrusion. (This 
component introduced in details in section 
(7.2)). 
• Testing and validating the FRI-IDS model. 
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The inference engine of the FRI-IDS 
model was performed by the Fuzzy Interpolation 
based on the Vague Environment method (FIVE). It 
was introduced by [33, 34, 35] in 1996. The FIVE 
method serves the deducible conclusions even in 
case if some situations are not explicitly defined in 
a fuzzy rule based knowledge representation. It is 
produced to serve many application areas such as 
IDS solution, which is served a crisp observation 
and at the same time required a crisp conclusion. It 
is worth mentioning that since using the FRI 
(FIVE) method as a inference engine there is no 
need for an additional defuzzification step. 
 
The architecture of the FRI-IDS model 
was shown in Figure 3 starts by data filtration phase 
where the network traffics (training data) analyzed 
in order to extract and determine the relevant 
features. During the data filtration phase, the 
irrelevant features were removed. It should be 
known that, the existence of irrelevant features 
could decrease the performance of FRI-IDS model. 
In the modeling phase the sparse fuzzy model 
identification [36] was performed, it had several 
actions, this includes the estimation of fuzzification 
and membership functions, fuzzy rules generation 
besides deducing the consequences and tuning 
methods. 
 
 
Figure 3: The Architecture of The FRI-IDS Model 
7.1 Data Filtration Phase 
The test-bed dataset was divided into 
training part and testing part. The training data 
consisted of 10000 records with 5000 normal cases 
and 5000 intrusion cases. The test data consisted of 
10000 records with 5000 of normal cases and 5000 
of intrusion cases. In order to increase the 
efficiency of IDS, it is important to identify the 
observable features that are relevant to detect 
intrusions from the network traffic data [3].  
 
These are some of relevant features: 
utilization, packet rate, byte rate, pkt size and pkt 
delay. For the sake of reducing the possible number 
of fuzzy rules and low complexity system, the 
highest three relevant features according to the IG 
algorithm were used as input parameters of FRI-
IDS model. These relevant features as found in 
Table 5 are the packet rate, byte rate and utilization. 
The anomaly based and misuse based detection 
techniques detect the attacks based on the 
predefined rule base (i.e. rules for normal and 
intrusions). For this, sorting the normal and 
intrusions cases of the training data is required [25]. 
Algorithm 1 presents the sorting and feature 
extraction of the training data. 
 
Algorithm 1: Sorting and Feature Extraction Algorithm 
Input: The training data 
Output: Two pools of test-bed dataset (normal and intrusion) 
1: while Termination Condition Not Met do 
2: Classify whole test-bed dataset into ”normal” and 
”attack” class 
3: Check for missing entry for all records 
4: Extract the suitable features for IDS based o IG 
algorithm 
5: Remove all irrelevant features 
6: Store the values of normal pool 
7: Store the values of intrusions pool 
8: end while 
 
    
The outputs of sorting and feature 
extraction algorithm were two pools of normal and 
intrusion records. These two pools consisted with 
only the relevant observable features that are 
suitable for FRI-IDS model (packet rate, byte rate 
and utilization) features, where all other values are 
removed. 
 
7.2 The Modeling Phase 
The part of fuzzy modeling considered as 
one of the important parts in the fuzzy system. The 
FRI-IDS model was constructed by using the sparse 
fuzzy model identification [36]. The training data of 
FRI-IDS model had three input parameters (packet 
rate, byte rate and utilization). These parameters 
were chosen according to the IG algorithm to infer 
the DDOS attack. In order to generate the optimized 
fuzzy rules and fuzzy sets, the Rule Base Extension 
using Default Set Shapes (RBE-DSS) method [37] 
was applied. According to [37, 38] the main steps 
of RBE-DSS method can be summarized as 
follows: 
• In the early stage of modeling the fuzzy 
system, the RBE-DSS method generates two 
rules that covered (fit) the minimum and 
maximum of the output. 
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• In the next step, the hill climbing tuning 
algorithm started. It is adjusting the previous 
parameter values one by one. For each 
iteration, the fuzzy system is evaluated with 
different parameters values based on training 
data. The retrieved parameters values ensure 
that the fuzzy system belongs to the better 
performance index for the later iterations. 
• The performance index is computed in each 
iteration to compare the obtained results with 
different parameter values. The relative root 
main square error was chosen as a 
performance index for tuning the FRI-IDS 
model. 
• On the assumption, the increasing of fuzzy 
system performance appeared too slow or 
interrupted (i.e. fuzzy system obtained the 
local minimum) then, the new fuzzy rule 
generated to increase the possibilities of fuzzy 
system enhancement. 
• The new fuzzy rule created in where the 
difference between the value of actual output 
and computed output is the maximum. 
• The tuning process stopped when the 
predefined performance index value obtained 
or when the number of iterations is reached. 
As a result of applying the RBE-DSS 
method, Figure 4 shows the support of antecedent 
fuzzy sets of the tuned FRI-IDS model based on the 
training data. 
 
 
Figure 4: Support of The Antecedent Fuzzy Sets of FRI-
IDS Model 
It is worth mentioning that, the generated 
fuzzy rules by RBE-DSS method were sparse, these 
fuzzy rules for the fuzzy interpolation and if it is 
implemented for a classical fuzzy reasoning there is 
no result could be obtained. Out of 28 fuzzy rules 
were generated in order to detect the DDOS attack 
based on the training data. Table 6 presents the 
generated fuzzy rules. Subsequently of modeling 
phase, the obtained fuzzy sets were represented by a 
trapezoidal membership functions. The byte rate 
and utilization input parameters have three 
trapezoidal membership functions and the packet 
rate input parameter has four trapezoidal 
membership functions. Table 7 (See Annexure 1) 
presents the optimized values of fuzzy sets for FRI-
IDS model based on the training data. 
Table 6: The Obtained Fuzzy Rules. 
No. Packet Rate Byte Rate Utilization Consequences 
1 L L L FA 
2 L L M FA 
3 L L H FA 
4 L M L FA 
5 L M M FA 
6 L M H FA 
7 L H L A 
8 L H M A 
9 L H H A 
10 M L L FA 
11 M L M FA 
12 M L H FA 
13 M M L FA 
14 M M M FA 
15 M M H FA 
16 M H L A 
17 M H M A 
18 M H H A 
19 H L L A 
20 H L M A 
21 H L H FA 
22 H M L A 
23 H M M A 
24 H M H A 
25 H H L A 
26 H H M A 
27 H H H A 
28 VL L L A 
 
FRI-IDS model serves crisp values and at 
the same time generates a crisp conclusion. 
Therefore, each observation within the training data 
in the example of this paper presented as a fuzzy 
singleton. Fuzzy systems had the capability to 
extension the binary decision to the continuous 
truth value which is more readable and easier to be 
understood and analyzed. Suppose that, there are 
two observations within the training data, the first 
observation had the following crisp values (packet 
                                               
 HINT: VL = VERY LOW, L = LOW, M = MEDIUM, H = HIGH, FA = 
FALSE ATTACK, A = ATTACK. 
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rate= 200, byte rate = 55943 and utilization = 
11560). The second observation had the following 
crisp values (packet rate= 900, byte rate = 1190251 
and utilization = 22029). The inferred consequence 
of FRI-IDS model for the previous two 
observations was shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 
(See Annexure 2 and Annexure 3) respectively 
where the first observation presents the normal 
event and the second observation shows the DDOS 
attack event. FRI-IDS model can serve the 
interpolated conclusions even in case if some 
observations are not covered directly by fuzzy rules 
as Figure 6 (See Annexure 3) presented. 
 
8. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section illustrates the testing and 
validating of the FRI-IDS model using the test-bed 
dataset. Thereupon, all experiments were conducted 
using Matlab [26] and FRI toolbox [39]. The 
inference engine of FRI-IDS model was performed 
using FIVE method. The code of FIVE method and 
other FRI methods can be used through FRI toolbox 
which can be downloaded freely from [39]. The 
overall process of testing and validating the FRI-
IDS model was shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: The Testing and Validating Process of FRI-IDS 
Model 
The FRI-IDS model was tested and 
evaluated based on two test scenarios: 
• The first test titled as the normal test scenario 
where 5000 instance of normal cases are used 
as input parameters of FRI-IDS model. The 
extracted 5000 instance of normal cases 
presented as matrix of normal test. 
Normal Test Matrix  




















ilization        UtRate Byte       RatePkt 
.                       .                      .   
.                       .                      .   
3092              379060              658  
5961               124944              125  
23632              505434              328  
 
• The second test scenario was titled as 
intrusions test scenario where 5000 instance of 
intrusion cases are used as input parameters of 
FRI-IDS model. The extracted 5000 instance 
of intrusion cases presented as a matrix of 
intrusion test. 
Intrusion Test Matrix 




















ilization        UtRate Byte       RatePkt 
.                       .                      .   
.                       .                      .   
       845               18067             328   
12381         1444030             963   
14377          1677420           1118   
 
The previous two matrices of normal and 
intrusion test scenarios were chosen as a two input 
testing files of FRI-IDS model. The evaluation of 
FRI-IDS model carried through the computed error 
metrics of the test scenarios. The inferred 
consequence of FRI-IDS model was compared 
along with the actual values of normal and 
intrusion. According to [15], the error metrics of 
the test scenarios were extended to the following 
performance metrics: 
• True Positive (TP): The total number of 
intrusion cases that inferred correctly by the 
FRI-IDS model. 
• True Negative (TN): The total number of 
normal cases that inferred correctly by the 
FRI-IDS model. 
• False Negative (FN): which is actually 
presented as important metric, the total 
number of intrusion cases that inferred 
incorrectly by the FRI-IDS model. 
• False Positive (FP): the total number of 
normal cases that inferred incorrectly by the 
FRI-IDS model. 
• Detection Rate (DR): is a performance metric 
of identifying the overall detection rate of the 
FRI-IDS model based on the test scenarios. It 
was computed by the total number of true 
positive cases and true negative cases divided 
by the total number of cases within the test 
scenario. 
 
Furthermore, the previous mentioned 
performance metrics offer the capability to compare 
the FRI-IDS model results with other algorithms 
that have been implemented for detecting DDOS 
attacks. As a result of the test scenarios of FRI-IDS 
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model, 10000 of cases were tested successfully. 
These cases were split as 5000 of normal cases and 
5000 of intrusion cases. During the normal test 
scenario, only 3 records of normal cases were 
inferred incorrectly by FRI-IDS model. Besides, 
during the intrusion test scenario, 332 of intrusion 
cases were inferred incorrectly by the FRI-IDS 
model. The obtained results beside the error metrics 
values presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: The Result Of The Test Scenarios Cases. 
 Normal Intrusion Total 
Normal 4997 3 5000 
Intrusion 332 4668 5000 
Total 5329 4671 10000 
 
According to the obtained results and the 
error metrics values of Table 8, the confusion 
matrix parameters of FRI-IDS model presented in 
Table 9. 
Table 9: Confusion Matrix Of FRI-IDS Model. 
Alert Response Intrusion Packet 
Prediction 
Normal Packet 
Prediction 
Intrusion TPR = 0.93 FNR = 0.06 
Normal FPR = 0.0006 TNR = 0.999 
 
The implemented experiments have 
demonstrated that, the FRI-IDS model obtained 
96.65% as an overall detection rate. The computed 
performance metrics concluded that, the FRI-IDS 
model obtained an acceptable value for the 
detection rate, and it decreases effectively the false 
positive rate. Decreasing the false positive rate 
helps to reduce the large amount of IDS alerts. To 
summarize the aforementioned results, the FRI-IDS 
model could be a suitable approach to be 
implemented as a detection mechanism for the 
following reasons: 
 
• The FRI-IDS model offers extension of the 
binary decision problem to continuous truth 
value, in which the inferred consequence like 
“the level of intrusion”, which makes the 
response result more readable and clearly 
analyzed rather than binary decision. 
• It is difficult to identify a clear boundary 
between normal and intrusion packets. 
Therefore, fuzzy system effectively smooths 
the abrupt break of normal and intrusion. 
• FRI methods can serve deducible 
(interpolated) conclusions even in case if some 
situations are not explicitly defined in a fuzzy 
rule based knowledge representation. 
• The implemented experiments show that the 
FRI-IDS model obtained an accepted value for 
detection rate and false positive rate. 
 
From another perspective, there are several 
convincing efforts of literature’s to implement 
different classification algorithms in order to 
prevent DDOS attacks. Therefore, to support the 
idea of implementing FRI-IDS model as a detection 
mechanism could be a suitable approach. The 
obtained results of FRI-IDS model compared with 
Alkasassbeh [21] and Irfan Sofi [22] results. They 
have employed different classification algorithms to 
detect the DDOS attacks using the same test-bed 
environment. Table 10 summarized the comparison 
result of FRI-IDS model with other classification 
algorithms. 
Table 10: FRI-IDS Model Vs Classification Algorithms. 
Authors Algorithms FRI 
Irfan Sofi 
et al. [22] 
Neural 
Network 
Naive 
Bayes 
Decision 
Tree 
Support 
Vector 
Machine 
FRI-IDS 
 
Detection 
Rate 
98.91% 96.89% 98.89% 92.31% 96.65% 
Alkasassbeh 
et al. [21] 
Neural 
Network 
Naive 
Bayes 
Random Forest 
FRI-IDS 
 
Detection 
Rate 
98.63% 96.91% 98.02% 96.65% 
 
9. DIFFERENCE FROM PRIOR WORKS 
 
According to the results, the overall 
detection rate of the FRI-IDS is in pair with other 
methods. On the example dataset it outperforms the 
detection rate of the support vector machine. FRI-
IDS reduced effectively false positive rate value 
which reduced the large number of IDS false alerts. 
Moreover, FRI-IDS offers the extension of the 
binary decision problem to continuous truth value, 
in which conclusions like    ”the level of the attack” 
can be also simply defined. From another 
perspective, there are valuable efforts of 
implementing the classical fuzzy reasoning for 
intrusion detection as it mentioned previously in the 
section (2).  
Nevertheless, these methods desire a dense 
fuzzy rules as a major requirement. Regarding to 
the large number of network connections, it could 
be very hard to comply the dense fuzzy rules. 
However, FRI-IDS model is characterized to offer 
the attack alert generation in case of lack of 
information and definition of existing knowledge 
base. It can generate their approximate conclusions 
either directly from inputs by an interpolating fuzzy 
function, or by interpolating a new fuzzy rule which 
overlaps the input.  
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10. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has investigated the capabilities 
to use the FRI methods in the IDS application area. 
This investigation is practiced by implementing the 
FRI-IDS model as a detection mechanism for 
DDOS attack. The FRI-IDS model was constructed 
using the sparse fuzzy model identification. The 
fuzzy rules of FRI-IDS model were generated and 
optimized using RBE-DSS method. In the example 
of the paper as a test-bed environment, an open 
source DDOS dataset was used. The implemented 
experiments have demonstrated that the FRI-IDS 
model obtained an accepted detection rate. It has 
reduced effectively the false positive rate value 
which decreased the large amount of IDS alerts. 
Additionally, the FRI-IDS model can serve the 
interpolated conclusions even in case if some 
observations are not covered directly by fuzzy 
rules. 
 
The obtained results of FRI-IDS model 
compared with other literature’s results which they 
employed different algorithms to detect the DDOS 
attacks using the same testbed environment, FRI-
IDS model outperforms the detection rate of 
support vector machine algorithm in the example of 
DDOS dataset, where other algorithms (neural 
network, random forest and decision tree) recorded 
lightly higher detection rate. Consequently, the 
FRI-IDS model could be a suitable approach for 
detecting intrusions if it is implemented as a 
detection mechanism. It is characterized by offering 
the capability to present the detection level of 
intrusion and permits the attack alert generation in 
case of a lack of information and definition of 
existing knowledge base. 
 
However, for future work, it could be 
useful to apply the FRI-IDS model along with other 
types of intrusions. Moreover, it is worthy, to 
examine how the FRI-IDS model could be applied 
with other FRI methods instead of FIVE method. 
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ANNEXURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: The Obtained Fuzzy Set Parameters Of FRI-IDS Model. 
Packet 
Rate 
Very Low Low Medium High 
[1  1  35.92  91.78] [166.81  222.66  278.51  334.36] [475.73  531.58 587.43   
643.28] 
[950.67  1006.52 1062.37   
1118] 
Byte Rate Low Medium High 
[55  55  83268.03 
167136.28] 
[461330.38   545198.63 629066.88   
712935.13] 
[1425835.73   1509703.98   1593572.23 1677420] 
Utilization Low Medium High 
[3  3  594.18 11235.33] [594.18  11235.33  12417.68 
23058.83] 
[12417.68   23058.83  23650  23650] 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: FRI-IDS Output Response in Case of Normal 
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ANNEXURE 3 
 
 
Figure 6: FRI-IDS Output Response in Case of Attack 
 
 
